What Is Magnifica Humanitas All About?
A Protestant appraisal of Pope Leo XIV’s Encyclical on AI
On May 15th, Pope Leo XIV published an Encyclical Letter called Magnifica Humanitas (noble humanity). As part of the ordinary teaching authority of the church, it lays out the church’s response to the “new things” of this age. In particular, this encyclical draws on over a century of Catholic Social Teaching. It applies this teaching to the realities of concentrated corporate power and the ever-expanding use of artificial intelligence in society (§96).
Within Catholic Social Teaching, a number of core principles underlie social action. In the context of Magnifica Humanitas, these are “the inalienable dignity of the human person, the common good, the universal destination of goods, subsidiarity, solidarity and social justice” (§96). In light of these premises, Magnifica Humanitas argues for a prudential and humane approach to emerging technologies like AI.
This is an important point, and it matters for reading Magnifica Humanitas. The letter works from certain principles (noted above) by an act of pastoral prudence. This method or approach does two things. First, it ensures that the encyclical can be applied in diverse places and times; and second, it shows by action a particularly human way of being and thinking. In short, the framing of the letter is humane as well as the recommendations.
While readers online accused the letter of being anti-AI, Magnifica Humanitas instead warns against the uncritical adoption of AI and advocates for a prudential approach to this emerging technology. In Pope Leo XIV’s words, “Calling for prudence, rigorous evaluation and even, at times, a slower pace in adopting AI does not mean opposing progress; instead, it is an exercise of responsible care for the human family” (§106).
From this vantage point, Magnifica Humanitas uses the biblical imagery of two cities: Babel and Jerusalem in Nehemiah’s time, when the walls were yet to be rebuilt. The former shows what happens when we advance too far without regard for humility; the latter shows how each family must come together to build the wall. This parable underscores Catholic teaching and provides a fundamental image for society in the age of AI. “The construction of Babel or the rebuilding of Jerusalem begins within each one of us” (§130).
And so Magnifica Humanitas ends with a parable, calling the Church to rebuild the walls of the city:
Nehemiah heard the cry of a devastated city, brought that pain to prayer, discerned before God, asked for help, received permission to return, organized the work, confronted internal and external resistance and rebuilt the walls of Jerusalem with the assistance of the people, brick by brick.
In this era of digital transformation, I see in him a striking parable of our own vocation, which is not to be passive spectators of social and cultural fractures, nor mere commentators on what is crumbling, but men and women prepared to enter the construction sites of history — research laboratories, technology companies, schools, the media, institutions and local communities — in order to rebuild what has collapsed and protect what is threatened. Like Nehemiah, we too are called to unite listening and courage, prayer and responsibility, so that, even when a technocratic mentality or partisan interests seem to prevail, the human city may become a more fitting place to live. (§241)
Notice here the call is not to retreat from technology but to build.
So while Leo XIV does not believe technology is neutral [“technology is never neutral, because it takes on the characteristics of those who devise, finance, regulate and use it” (§8).], he also realizes that it is not the use of technology but the vision that underlies it which makes it good or bad.
As he explains: “From the perspective of the Church’s Social Doctrine, the key issue is not the use of technology as such, but the vision that underlies it. If the human being is treated as something to be perfected or surpassed, it becomes easier to accept that some lives are less useful, less desirable or less worthy” (§117). So human beings are not mere machines, efficiently placed into a system for economic gain. Humans should not be viewed in machine terms, whether as workers or projects for transformation into some new thing.
In other words, a transhuman view of salvation may end up just abolishing what it means to be human. Or more pointedly, “what saves humanity is not enhanced self-sufficiency, but a relationship that liberates, a communion that transforms. In this light, a technology that merely classifies and optimizes what already exists can, however unintentionally, become an obstacle to change and growth. For an algorithm, an error is a flaw to be corrected; for a person, however, an error can be a catalyst for profound change. A person’s future is not calculable, but depends on one’s freedom — elevated by the inexhaustible grace of God — and on the relationships cultivated.” (§128)
The phrase that a “person’s future is not calculable” may surprise some readers. But if that assertion seems improbable, it might be evidence that one has already accepted the messaging of the Conditioners, those who impose their will on the many through excess power.
And these Conditioners use technology to enframe society, our imaginations even, so that we can not even understand the possibility of being human apart from technological language. We ask, Did you have a productive weekend? I hope not! I hope it was unproductive and inefficient and thereby deeply human.
As Leo XIV notes, “When [technology] becomes the standard by which everything is judged, it begins to dictate what matters and what can be discarded, reducing creation to an object of exploitation and human beings to mere cogs in a system driven toward ever greater efficiency” (§92). But efficiency is not a natural good, although it may serve such goods.
Here is another way to put it. Can AI be intelligent, be conscious like we are? If the answer is yes, then I would suggest that we have transfigured our imagination by being enframed by technological society. Put simply, the fact that AI’s consciousness seems possible already assumes a definition of consciousness that is machine-like.
Hence, it is refreshing to hear Leo XIV say, “It is not possible to provide a single, comprehensive definition of AI. What can be stated, however, is that we must avoid the misconception of equating this type of “intelligence” with that of human beings” (§99). Why is that?
He explains:
These systems merely imitate certain functions of human intelligence. In doing so, they often surpass human intelligence in speed and computational capacity, offering tangible benefits across many fields. Yet this power remains entirely tied to data processing. So-called artificial intelligences do not undergo experiences, do not possess a body, do not feel joy or pain, do not mature through relationships and do not know from within what love, work, friendship or responsibility mean. Nor do they have a moral conscience, since they do not judge good and evil, grasp the ultimate meaning of situations, or bear responsibility for consequences.
They may imitate language, behavior and analytical skills, or even simulate empathy and understanding, but they do not understand what they produce, for they lack the affective, relational and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom. Even when these tools are described as capable of “learning,” their way of doing so is different from that of a human person. It is not the experience of those who allow themselves to be shaped by life and grow over time through choices, mistakes, forgiveness and fidelity. Rather, it is a form of statistical adaptation based on data and feedback, which can be very effective, but does not imply inner growth” (§99).
Obviously, many will disagree with these points. But the fundamental point is: if one thinks AI intelligence is akin to human intelligence, then one works from a different assumption of intelligence than the person who denies this kinship.
One needs to read the document itself to get a feel for the total argument, but my appraisal (for whatever it is worth) is that the encyclical successfully articulates Catholic Social Teaching for the “new thing.”
As a Protestant, I can appreciate the arguments because we (Rome and Protestantism) share a basic agreement on moral theology and thus social teaching.
As a final note, the encyclical refers to Romano Guardini, whose work I have read and written on.
Source: https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html